At first glance, it appears that the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights -the first pancontinental court of the African Union (AU) for human rights protection -epitomises the advances made by international courts in Africa in the past decade. Since its first judgment in 2009 the Court has taken a robust approach to its mandate and its docket is growing apace. However, a closer look at the overall context in which the Court operates reveals that it is susceptible to many of the patterns of resistance that have hampered other international courts in the region, which cut across the development of its authority and impact. This paper analyses the forms and patterns of resistance against the African Court and the actors involved, emphasising the additional difficulties entailed in mapping resistance to a young court compared to long-established courts, such as the European and Inter-American human rights courts.
I. Introduction
This article examines resistance to the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights (hereinafter, 'the African Court') based in Arusha, Tanzania, which has been in operation since 2006. Although the African Court is still a young court, it has energetically seized its mandate and has found a raft of rights violations in the limited number of cases before it to date, which has been met with clear resistance and which is likely to generate further resistance given the regional context in which the Court operates.
In a continent notorious for upholding state sovereignty and the principles of non-interference even in the face of grave human rights violations (Cole, 2010) , and where other human rights protection bodies such as the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights have struggled to have an impact (Bekker, 2013) , resistance to the Court has taken a variety of forms, some of which are dissimilar to those found in other regions. So far, no major or significant forms of resistance, in the form of 'backlash', have occurred in response to the Court's jurisprudence which would fundamentally undermine its functioning. However, other forms of resistance have appeared, such as Rwanda's withdrawal of its declaration permitting individuals and qualified NGOs to petition the Court and early signs of resistance by Tanzania (the host state) in the form of non-compliance with key judgments of the Court. Considering earlier backlash against other regional courts in Africa such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) tribunal (Alter, Gathii and Helfer, 2016) , it is possible that at this point in time we can identify the beginnings of distinct patterns of resistance that might start out as reactions to a particular judgment or a set of judgments (or even cases pending before the Court) and which may eventually escalate into a more systemic and even transnational critique of the court, resulting in either changes to the system, rendering it defunct by starving it of resources, or even shutting it down entirely.
The introduction to this special issue on resistance against international courts (ICs) sets out a useful framework for analysing the forms and patterns of resistance to such courts, which has become an increasingly common global phenomenon (Madsen, Cebulak and Wiebusch, 2018) .
While resistance to the African Court is a theme running through much of the literature on the Court, the varieties, patterns, and processes of resistance to the Court have not been systematically studied. The aim of this article is therefore to map the way in which the Court and its jurisprudence have developed and to analyse the forms and patterns of resistance to the Court generated by its case-law. In doing so, the article pays attention to the contextual factors that influence the nature, scope and intensity of these processes of resistance.
Applying the theoretical framework concerning resistance to ICs developed by Madsen et al. to the African Court as a case-study provides useful additional insights. Most importantly, it emphasises that charting resistance against a young court can be more difficult than charting resistance against a long-established court, given that what looks like resistance may in fact relate to difficulties in building the Court's de facto authority (Alter, Helfer and Madsen, 2016) . This poses the question of where and how the two analytical frameworks, related to resistance and authoritybuilding, overlap. Indeed, although some reactions against the African Court follow familiar forms and patterns of resistance against IC jurisprudence in other world regions, some of the resistance discussed below is hard to categorise as 'pushback' or 'backlash', but rather reflects attempts to hinder the minimum development of an IC toward becoming an effective institution in the first place. In a sense, this places young courts such as the African Court in an intermediate category lying somewhere between 'paper courts' established by treaty but which never become operational, and long-established ICs which have developed an appreciable level of de facto authority. As such, the term 'young court' here does not denote a rigid conceptual category but rather a broad rubric for ICs lying in this ill-defined area of the spectrum. Second, the youth of the African Court, and autocratic governance in key states under its purview, affects the configuration and interaction of resistance actors, with national governments and NGOs playing a more central role as sites of resistance, and other actors which are central elsewhere -chiefly national courts and the mediafeaturing far less prominently.
The article contains four sections. Section II briefly addresses the analytical framework for resistance set out by Madsen, Cebulak and Wiebusch (2018) . Section III sets out fundamental contextual factors that affect the overall operation of the African Court. Section IV analyses the African Court's design and development, and how resistance has hindered its development to date.
Section V addresses the evolution of the Court's case-law to date and discusses resistance to its case-law, focusing on two key respondent states: Tanzania, the Court's host state and subject of six of its twelve merits judgments to date; and Rwanda, which has expressed the strongest negative reaction to the Court's case-law. The conclusion summarises the key insights gleaned from the case-study as a whole.
II. Forms and patterns of resistance
This section builds on the analytical framework developed by Madsen, Cebulak and Wiebusch in this issue (2018) . We focus here on the categorisation of different forms of resistance, the general approach of studying resistance and the relationship between different actors in producing patterns of resistance.
As discussed by Madsen et al., resistance can take different forms, and the core distinction made here is between 'pushback' and 'backlash'. Pushback is used to denote resistance within the established rules of the game (ordinary critique), with the aim of reverting developments in the jurisprudence of an IC in specific areas of law. By contrast, backlash denotes resistance that is not based on acceptance of the rules of the game (extra-ordinary critique), challenges the authority and institutional set-up of an IC, and tends to involve collective action by member states (Madsen, Cebulak and Wiebusch, 2018) .
The organising concept of 'resistance' used in this special issue relates primarily to the process, and not the outcome, of resistance. In contrast to Alter, Gathii and Helfer (2016) , who analyse resistance mostly as something that is successful or unsuccessful, the framework disaggregates backlash and considers it as a process which can lead to an outcome, but which does not necessarily have a discernible impact. This focus on process allows us to analyse dynamics of resistance even where it has no concrete consequences for the Court's case law or structure.
The framework also makes clear that resistance can proceed according to different patterns depending on the actors involved. As emphasised by Madsen et al., it is important to disaggregate the term 'resistance' by moving from general references to 'Member States' and identifying instead specific governance and civil society actors that play key roles in the different forms of resistance faced by an IC. This is especially the case since resistance at one site can be expressed in different ways, founded on different premises, and of varying levels of intensity, but can become mutually reinforcing where a dominant narrative of resistance, or points of consensus, emerge. Resistance can emanate from a single actor (e.g. national government) or, more commonly, a constellation of different actors within the governance system (e.g. courts, political parties) and civil society (NGOs, media, academics) . This analysis follows this emphasis on specific actors. However, as the analysis below indicates, resistance to the African Court to date appears to have emanated from smaller constellations of actors, and is affected by the system of governance in different states.
As explained by the Madsen et al., to fully understand the rationale and development of resistance as expressed by these actors, it is crucial to consider the wider context in which the African Court operates, and fundamental contextual factors that influence the emergence and direction of resistance against the African Court. These are addressed in the following section.
III. The context of resistance against the African Court
Resistance against the African Court is considerably influenced by a variety of factors relating to the socio-political, historical and institutional context in which it operates. Aligned with the model developed by Madsen et al., this section highlights these fundamental contextual factors for understanding such resistance, which are essential to the analysis of the constellation of actors evincing resistance to the African Court in the following sections. In order to better convey the unique context of the African Court the article engages in limited comparison with the longerestablished European and Inter-American human rights courts.
The most fundamental contextual factor to appreciate when analysing resistance against the African Court is that it operates in a continent where a variety of governance systems exist, ranging from authoritarian states to well-established democracies. Many African states are still faced with massive governance challenges and systematic violations of human rights, relating to ongoing conflict, humanitarian crises, internal displacement of peoples, terrorist attacks, political instability, widespread use of torture and ill-treatment by law-enforcement and security forces, arbitrary arrest and detention, abduction and killing of human rights defenders and political opponents, restrictions on freedom of expression, and limitations on access to information. Second, the historical experience of ICs and quasi-judicial bodies with human rights protection mandates in Africa is important. The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (hereinafter 'the African Commission'), created as a stand-alone institution in 1987, is the key pre-existing institution with a pan-continental human rights protection mandate (and which continues to function in tandem with the African Court, as set out below). The Commission from the outset faced serious resistance and found little room to manoeuvre. Although the Commission has alternated between a deferential posture, seen in its focus on 'positive dialogue', and more assertive stances on key issues including the use of secret military trials, and rights to free speech and fair trial (Bekker, 2013) , the one thread running through its thirty years of existence is that states have generally refused to implement its recommendations (Murray and Long, 2015) .
Alongside this generalised resistance against the authority of the African Commission, other ICs on the continent that have adopted assertive stances on human rights have met with significant resistance. For instance, the Tribunal of the 15-member Southern African Development Community (SADC), established in 1992, was effectively 'dismantled' in 2012 due to opposition to its judgments challenging expropriation of land from white settlers in Zimbabwe, after a campaign spearheaded by Zimbabwe Initially suspended, the Tribunal returned in 2014 with its jurisdiction reduced to inter-State disputes and individual petitions prohibited. (Alter, Gathii and Helfer, 2016, p. 306-314) . The East African Court of Justice (EACJ) and the ECOWAS Court have also been targets of backlash (spearheaded by Kenya and Gambia, respectively) when they have attempted to address human rights violations and electoral matters, which in the latter case has led to caution regarding expansive interpretation of its mandate (Alter, Gathii and Helfer, 2016, p. 300 Given that the Court's formal authority and structure are described in detail in a number of key publications (e.g. Viljoen, 2012; Cole, 2010; FIDH, 2010) , here it suffices to set out the basics. That said, two other factors open the door to more expansive adjudication by the Court. First, the Charter also guarantees collective social and economic rights (e.g. the rights to economic, social and cultural development and to a general satisfactory environment in Articles 22 and 24), although it must be emphasised that the Court's establishment was not a concrete possibility when the Charter was adopted. In addition, the African Court's subject-matter jurisdiction is more expansive than that of the ECtHR and IACtHR in that it is also empowered to interpret 'any other relevant human rights instruments' that have been ratified by the respondent State (e.g. the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 8 and regional instruments such as the African
Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance and the ECOWAS Democracy Protocol 9 ). As pointed out by Madsen, Cebulak and Wiebusch, such institutional factors concerning subject-matter jurisdiction can be influential in the context of possible pushback and backlash against the Court.
Although the jurisdiction of the Court is formally restricted to a human rights mandate, the Court's power to consider other relevant human rights instruments, and the wide or narrow interpretation it
gives to the understanding of what counts as a 'human rights' instrument, evidently has the potential to expand the extent of its jurisdiction, as discussed in the analysis of the Court's jurisprudence, discussed below.
b. Resistance hampering the Court's development: Key actors
The Court's overall development has been hampered by a variety of factors, some of which are evidence of clear resistance to the Court, while others reflect a more ambiguous picture which may indicate resistance but or simply the Court's low visibility among key audiences (e.g. national courts). Reflecting the focus in the framework developed by Madsen, Cebulak and Wiebusch (2018) on an actor constellation comprising member states, the rest of this section analyses the various forms of resistance to the African Court, centred on (i) national governments, which represent and shape the Member State's overall relationship with the Court; (ii) national courts as core actors in the legal system 'gate-keepers' for the penetration of IC jurisprudence in national law; and (iii) NGOs, which are key civil society actors. This helps to provide context for more detailed discussion of resistance against the Court's case-law, discussed in Section V.
National governments
The positions taken by national governments, as primary actors in resistance patterns against the African Court, evince a significant level of resistance to the Court's authority, which takes a variety of forms.
The first, and most basic form of resistance, concerns refusal to ratify the Court's founding the Court in a position of institutional insecurity. It cannot be certain that it will remain in its current form in the near future, which affects its ability to build itself as an institution. As Nmehielle noted in 2014, the AU appears quite serious about the Protocol but adequate thought has not been given to its implications and the prospect that it could 'suffer from neglect, lack of political and practical commitment from member states, and lack of the adequate resources required to make it effective', especially in the context of the meagre resources provided to African Court since its establishment (Nmehielle, 2014) .
National courts
As the framework set out by Madsen, Cebulak and Wiebusch emphasises, the attitudes of national courts toward an IC are highly significant, and it may be said that they are the most consequential actors beyond national governments. 
V. Development of the Court's case-Law
Understanding of the Court's case-law is key to appreciating the processes of resistance to date from national governments and other actors, but also how the Court has used its case-law to mitigate design flaws hampering its effectiveness and to expand its mandate. This section starts 16 See (right to personal liberty, security and protection from arbitrary arrest) and 7 (right to fair trial).
Later that year the Court delivered another strong judgment on an electoral matter, ruling in APDH aid, timely issuance of trial judgements, organisation of identification parades, and appropriate consideration of defences forwarded by the defendant (Possi, 2017; Windridge, 2017 ). The African Court's website lists 100 cases pending before the Court, which suggests that its case-law is set to expand significantly in the coming years, although as discussed below, 80 of these applications concern Tanzania. Due to spatial constraints this section focuses on clear resistance to the Court's decisions in two states: Tanzania, which is both the Court's host state and the subject of six of its twelve merits judgments to date; and Rwanda, which has had the strongest negative reaction to the Court's caselaw to date. In line with the analytical framework set out by Madsen, Cebulak and Wiebusch, the analysis seeks to identify specific actors engaged in resistance, rather than analysing member states as monolithic entities, and to appreciate the wider context in which such resistance has occurred.
b. Resistance against the Court's case-law

Tanzania
The relationship between a human rights IC and its host state is not always easy. For example, it is not unusual for the IC to receive more complaints against its host state than other states under its purview (e.g. petitions against France to the ECtHR). However, while both the ECtHR and IACtHR developed for years without having to issue a merits judgment in a contentious case against their respective host states, the African Court has already issued six judgments against Tanzania, including its first merits judgment.
33 See APDH v. Cote D'Ivoire (2016) , par. 26 and 31.
In its first landmark Mtikila judgment the Court unanimously found the constitutional and legislative bans on independent candidacy in elections to constitute violations of freedom of association and the right to participate in public and governmental affairs, and a violation of the non-discrimination provisions of the Charter (by a 7-2 majority). In doing so the Court expressly held that a provision of the Tanzanian Constitution contravened the African Charter and ordered the State to take all 'constitutional, legislative and all other necessary measures within a reasonable time' to remedy the violations found. The Court was unmoved by the State's argument that local remedies had not been exhausted due to a constitutional reform process -initiated while the issue was before the Tanzanian courts -that would leave the question of independent candidacies to the Tanzanian people. The State was also unsuccessful in its secondary arguments on the merits, based on the social needs, historical reality of a one-party state, security concerns, federal structure of the State, and the need to avoid tribalism in the political system, which would require 'a gradual construction of a pluralist democracy in unity' (para. 119, 51).
Interestingly, the applicants before the African Court included two NGOs, the Tanganyika Law Society and the Human Rights Centre, and an individual, Reverend Christopher Mtikila -the latter having already challenged the ban on independent candidates twice before the domestic courts in a decades-long campaign to open up the political system. While the African Court's judgment marked an expansive approach to its mandate, the NGOs had urged the Court to go even further, by adjudicating on whether the State had 'violated the rule of law by initiating a constitutional review process to settle an issue pending before the courts of Tanzania' (para. 4) -an argument the Court declined to address.
Although Tanzania had engaged fully with the Court during the entire process (unlike other states before the Court, such as Libya), at the reparations stage of the proceedings the Court expressed concern at the government's continued position that the judgment was incorrect, on the basis that the law in Tanzania prohibited independent candidates from running for election (Windridge, 2015) . The government has continued to refuse to comply with the judgment or to report to the Court on any measures it has taken to implement the judgment: the section on implementation of the Court's judgments in its mid-term activity report for 2017 indicates that while the Tanzanian government has published the judgment on an official government website and a summary in its Official Gazette and a daily newspaper with wide circulation, the government has not taken any constitutional, legislative or other measures required to remedy the violations found The pattern of resistance, if there is one, is of stubborn refusal by the government to abide by the Court's judgments or engage with its orders. As one scholar put it in an analysis of the Court's fair trial judgments against Tanzania (Possi, 2017, p. 335 Nevertheless, alongside such resistance there is a growing tendency for individuals and NGOs to petition the Court (Tanzania has made the special declaration allowing such petitions): of the 100 pending cases listed on the Court's website are again heavily weighted toward the host state 80 are against Tanzania -the remainder are Rwanda (12; although 7 relate to the same applicant), Mali (4), Benin (1), Côte d'Ivoire (1) and Ghana (1). NGOs have also called on the government to take concrete action to implement the Court's judgments, such as the Legal and Human Rights Centre (LHRC) and the Tanzania Civil Society Consortium on Election Observation (TACCEO) which has urged the government to undertake 'necessary reforms' to abide by the Mtikila judgment. 34 As such, the constellation of actors involved in resistance to the Court is largely reduced to a binary opposition between the government and NGOs.
The resistance of the Tanzanian government to the African Court's judgments has been clear, but has not led to any broader campaign to withdraw from the Court or to seek reform of its jurisdiction to render it less effective, which is possibly due to civil society support for the institution, but which may also relate to its delicate relationship with Court as its host state. It is also A broader insight can also be made with regard to the resistance framework set out by Madsen, Cebulak and Wiebusch. In democratic states different sites of authority operate with considerable independence, and significant resistance tends to depend on a sufficient level of consensus emerging among multiple actors. In authoritarian regimes, by contrast, one can expect the national government to take the leading role in resistance against an IC, and -depending on the extent to which they have been 'captured' by the government -national courts and the media might be considered as 'national government' actors rather than separate actors in the constellation of resistance actors. As the Rwexit experience indicates, such governance systems also permit rapid reactions against an IC, which differs starkly from the slow building of a broad-based 'resistance consensus' seen in states such as the United Kingdom, which itself resonated with resistance actors in states including the Netherlands and Russia.
Moreover, civil society actors, especially human rights NGOs, tend to be more active and numerous in a democratic regime than an authoritarian regime, with the result that their role in resistance processes will be affected by the nature of the State in which they operate. As the Freedom House, 2018, p. 18) . This clearly has the capacity to affect how the State, and civil society actors, will relate to the Court in the near future, and may be a significant explanatory factor for the State's inaction regarding implementation of judgments to date.
The position of the Rwandan government toward the Court has recently increased in importance, and comes into play in an emerging process of potential institutional reform of the Court that may also become a vector for weakening of the Court. In particular, the AU has mandated President Kagame (who is Chairperson of the AU for 2018) to lead a committee charged with examining institutional reform options for the AU, including reviewing and clarifying the roles of its courts. 44 Considering that the Rwandan government has already signalled resistance to the Court through the withdrawal of its special declaration in 2016, this reform process raises concerns.
Although no concrete proposals have been made at the time of writing, and this process cannot be described as a clear form of backlash, the Kagame recommendations could mirror the InterAmerican context, where resistance to the human rights Commission and Court by neo-Bolivarian states such as Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador has led to (as yet unsuccessful) proposals to reform the Commission that would significantly weaken the operation of both organs. 45 Even if such reform comes to nothing, the precedent alone set by Rwanda as the first state to withdraw its special declaration, may have made this option more politically acceptable to some states than it previously appeared, and may have also rendered full withdrawal more palatable.
VI. Conclusion
As suggested in the introduction to this piece, the African Court as a case-study of resistance against ICs offers a number of key insights. It suggests that understanding resistance against a young court requires a form of double analysis, employing analytical frameworks for understanding both resistance and authority-building. So far in the African context, resistance has remained at the level of pushback, in the sense that it generally emanated from single states without collective ambition to engage in institutional reform as a reaction to the Court's case-law. However, this casestudy underscores that institutional structure has path-dependent effects and can shape the form in which resistance is expressed. In particular, the two-tier nature of access to the Court, requiring a specific state declaration to expand access to individuals and qualified NGOs, provides an additional avenue for resistance by states, whether by refusing to make the declaration (as twothirds of the current 30 states have done) or, in the Rwexit scenario, withdrawing the declaration in retaliation to judgments against the state. The African Court case-study also highlights the importance of the overall political context in which an IC functions: resistance emanating from authoritarian regimes can differ from resistance emanating from more democratic regimes (although all exist on a spectrum, and this is not to say that resistance strategies from authoritarian and democratic states will necessarily differ). Resistance can come about more swiftly and national governments tend to take on a more central role in authoritarian states than in the slow consensusbuilding required within democratic states. Overall, the single most important form of resistance to a young court is the strategy of ignoring the court by not allowing it to exercise the full de jure authority and jurisdiction accorded to it by its founding treaty. Patterns of resistance in the African Court context also appear to involve smaller constellations of actors, with national courts and the media in particular playing little role in resistance against the Court to date. Specific reasons for resistance can be difficult to discern, as seen in the terseness and taciturnity of the Tanzanian government, or can hinge on one central issue, as seen in the Rwandan context. With most analyses of the Court's case-law focusing on description and discrete legal areas rather than the broad picture, this analysis highlights the need for further work in understanding the specific audiences, resistance constellations and dynamics of resistance in the African context.
